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NOTE
COMPETITORS' STANDING TO CHALLENGE
ADMINSTRATIVE ACTION UNDER THE APA
Prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act,1 the law
governing a competitor's standing to challenge administrative action was
in a confused state.2  The enactment of section 10(a) of the APA 3 has
compounded the uncertainty since it is not clear whether prior law, what-
ever its content, was codified or changed. This problem of competitors'
standing will be considered in three contexts: in the absence of a statutory
provision for appeal by aggrieved persons, appeal under such statutes, and
under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
COMPETITORS' STANDING ABSENT AN "AGGRIEVED PERSON" PROVISION
In the absence of statutory authorization for judicial review of adminis-
trative action by "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" persons, standing to
challenge governmental action must be based upon injury to a legally
protected interest.4 A series of Supreme Court cases in the 1930's estab-
lished that a commercial enterprise which does not hold an exclusive fran-
chise has no "right" to be free from unauthorized federal action if the only
detrimental effect upon it is injury incident to increased competition. In
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes 5 and Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County,6
the suits of private power companies contesting federal authority to finance
the construction of competing municipal power facilities were dismissed.
Since state law authorized municipalities to engage in the power business,
plaintiffs were injured merely by lawful competition. Again, in Tennessee
Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 7 the plaintiffs were held to have no standing
to challenge federal authority to compete with them through TVA because
plaintiffs' injury merely resulted from increased competition. The rule
1. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
2. For the role of judicial review in the administrative process, see ATT'Y GEN.
CoMM. ON ADMINIsTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT 76-79 (1941).
3. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1952).
4. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). Considerations of the
separation of governmental powers as well as the constitutional mandate of "case" or
"controversy" require that the constitutionality of governmental acts is to be deter-
mined only as an incident to the judicial function of redressing injury. Therefore,
the litigant not only must show injury as a result of unlawful government action
but also that his injured interest is one which the courts will protect. Ibid. Predic-
tion of what will be a sufficient showing of legal injury for purposes of standing may
be difficult since the usual judicial explanation for denial of standing is the circular
statement that no legal injury is shown. For an attempt to indicate factors relevant
to this determination, see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 149-57 (1951) (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
5. 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
6. 302 U.S. 485 (1938).
7. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). Contra, Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515
(1929).
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of these cases still is so well established 8 that there have been relatively few
suits attempting to meet the "legal injury" requirement by basing standing
solely on competitive injury.9
However, in recent competitor cases, some attempt has been made to
modify the scope of the "legal injury" rule.' This succeeded in Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Summerfield,11 where a railroad was permitted tb chal-
lenge a Post Office decision to utilize air rather than rail carriage. Stand-
ing was permitted on the theory that the railroad had sufficient interest
in that it had been obligated to provide and maintain facilities for mail car-
riage. Although the rule that competitive injury in itself is insufficient basis
for standing absent a statute was not rejected, the case suggests a possible
more liberal attitude toward competitors' standing when official action in
granting subsidies is involved.'
2
COMPETITORS' STANDING UNDER THE "AGGRIEVED PERSON" STATUTES
General
Most cases involving competitors' standing arise under statutory
standing provisions enacted prior to the APA. Congress avoided the
"legal injury" rule by providing in several statutes that "aggrieved persons"
have a right to challenge administrative action. Actually, this identifying
phrase is not the same in all of the statutes; its basic variants are "aggrieved
person," Is person "adversely affected," 14 and "any party in inter-
8. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); United Milk Producers v. Benson, 225 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.
Mo.) (alternative holding), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
9. See Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 204 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953) (motor carrier has no standing to enjoin
issuance of commemorative postage stamp honoring competing railroad); compare
Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (unsuccessful bidder for airport con-
cession has no standing to assert CAB's non-compliance with statutory bid pro-
cedure), with McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (unsuccessful
bidder was permitted to challenge grant of mineral lease to a bidder known to have
violated applicable regulations without any discussion of standing); cf. Chapman v.
Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950) (suit challenged federal action
favorable to a competitor on the ground it violated applicable regulations; appellant
attempted to base standing on injury to a contractual right by asserting the allegedly
violated regulations impliedly were incorporated into his federal coal lease).
10. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (attempt to base standing on allegations of official
conspiracy rejected). See also Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S.
621 (1950), and notes 11 and 12 infra.
11. 229 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
12. For a, discussion of the need for judicial review of subsidy grants and
standing developments in this area, see Eisenberg, Judicial Standing in Subsidy Cases:
Availability of Review Should Be Expanded, 41 A.B.A.J. 718 (1955).
13. Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 80, 15 U.S.C. §77i(a) (1952); Public
Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1952);
Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1952) ; Federal Com-
munications Act, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §402(b) (1952). Some statutes
extend such standing only to an "aggrieved party." See, e.g., Securities Exchange
Act, 48 STAT. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78y(a) (1952); Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT.
831 (1938). 15 U.S.C. §717r(b) (1952).
14. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U.S.C.
§371(f) (1952); Federal Communications Act, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b) (1952).
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est." 15 Since congressional choice of these different terms seems to have
been fortuitous and the courts have not interpreted them to have intrinsic-
ally different meanings,' 6 it is convenient to refer to them collectively in this
section as "aggrieved person" provisions.
Under these provisions, the litigant must show detriment to obtain
standing; however, his own injury need not be a "legal injury" or related
to the substantive issues which will be raised.T For example, the Federal
Communications Act '8 does not protect radio stations from loss of revenue
due to the licensing of competing stations. This financial detriment is
significant only in that it may qualify the radio stations to appeal the action;
the substantive case against the administrator must be based on other
grounds.1 9
.Tidicial Interpretation of the "Aggrieved Person" Standard
The statutory limitation on the number of appeals, expressed by the
"aggrieved" requirement, probably derives from the belief that litigants
who do not have a personal interest in the outcome of the litigation would
not meet the constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement.2° The
courts have regarded the injury that would satisfy this constitutional re-
quirement of adverse effect as insufficient to sustain standing under the
"aggrieved person" statutes, on the belief that administrative policies
require a more restrictive approach to standing. A liberal application of
statutory standing might result in a flood of suits and appeals, thereby
interfering with effective administrative action,2 or might "clog" the ad-
15. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1932)
("party in interest"); cf. Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 STAT. 1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C.
§ 646(a) (1952) ("a substantial interest").
16. Davis, Standing To Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MiN. L. Rnv. 353,
359 & n.30 (1955). But see Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 STAT. 1055
(1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(e), (f) (1 952) ("Any interested person" may participate
in the agency proceeding but a right of appeal is granted to any person who will be
"adversely affected."); Federal Communications Act, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 47
U.S.C. § 402(b) (1952) (both "aggrieved" and "adversely affected" persons may
appeal).
17. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475-77 (1940);
Pittsburgh v. FPC, 24 U.S.L. WEEx 2418, 2419 (D.C. Cir. March 8, 1956).
18. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 15-609 (1952).
19. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The factor of
competition between the applicant and existing licensees is relevant to whether the
license should issue only where destructive competition between them may deprive
the public of any effective service. Tbid.
20. U.S. CoxsT. art. III, § 2. Since the "legal injury" requirement of standing
is derived from conceptions of the proper relation of the federal courts to the execu-
tive and legislative branches, see note 4 mpra, no constitutional problem is presented
when Congress provides that less deference is to be accorded to administrative acts.
However, the Supreme Court has not retreated from its position in Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), that the litigant must have a personal interest in the
outcome of the dispute. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (concurring opinion); FCC v. National Broadcasting Co.,
319 U.S. 239, 265 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
21. See, e.g., United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d
116, 120 (2d Cir. 1943). But see Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
707 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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ministrative process since litigation of an agency decision may deprive it
of practical effect for a substantial period of time.22 It is also possible that
persons who will fully and diligently contest the disputed action best
promote the public interest in correcting administrative error by providing
the most effective challenge to the agency decision. While this is not
expressed, it may underlie the courts' concern with the "directness" of the
alleged injury.2
These policies dictate the limitation of suits and appeals by aggrieved
persons and a factual study of the cases indicates that certain factors, al-
though unarticulated, apparently have influenced the selection of litigants.
2 4
A primary factor is whether suit or appeal by other persons will represent
the position of the litigant,25 although those persons have not challenged
the agency in this case.26 The severity of the potential litigant's injuries
may be considered, since it is likely to be related to the diligence of his
challenge.27 The importance of deciding a case on the merits, especially
if it presents a novel question which has been well presented, may induce
a court to permit standing.28 When the litigant is a member of a group
22. See FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239, 260 (1943) (dissenting
opinion) ; cf. FCC ANN. RFP. 93 (1954) (protests made unnecessarily and to delay
licensing of competitors). Consider, for example, the delay created by the review
of one order certifying the construction of a natural gas pipe line. Final modification
of the agency order was entered May 6, 1947. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.,
6 F.P.C. 616 (1947). The circuit court affirmed on June 3, 1948. Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Certiorari was denied Octo-
ber 25, 1948. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 335 U.S. 854 (1948). The
fact that construction is undertaken while a case is on appeal will not prevent reversal
of an improper order. Cf. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 195 F.2d
872 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 818 (1952) (case remanded to FPC for further
hearing on competitive application after first licensee had almost completed construc-
tion), as elucidated in Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334, 336
(1st Cir. 1953). Therefore, construction probably would not be commenced pending
the outcome of court review.
23. L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295, 304 (1940) ("indirect");
United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116, 120-21 (2d Cir.
1943) ("remote") ; cf. Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Chicago, 115 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1940)
("remote").
24. See, generally, Note, Statutory Standing To Review Administrative Action,
98 U. PA. L. REv. 70 (1949).
25. See, e.g., L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295, 305 (1940)
(concurring opinion). Compare Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S.
432 (1946), with American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945).
26. If a litigant who shows some detriment may be the only person with sufficient
interest to raise the question of administrative error, standing may be upheld. See
Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947) ; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470 (1940); Pittsburgh v. FPC, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2418 (D.C. Cir. March 8,
1956); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955); A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 120 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1941).
27. See text at note 23 supra. A belief that a personal interest in the outcome of
the dispute results in stronger adversary interest and, therefore, in fuller litigation of
the issues seems to be the basis for the judicial rule that "case" or "controversy" re-
quires the litigant to show "adverse effect."
28. Compare Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 219 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955) (rigorous investigation of appellant's alleged
injury), with Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (injury
assumed to be substantial) and A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture,
120 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1941) (from facts recited by court injury seems unlikely).
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whose interests the statute was designed to protect, courts may be inclined
to recognize his standing.29 The manner in which these various factors
may influence the determination of a particular competitor case can be
illustrated by a fuller consideration of the problems of statutory standing
in the context of the decided cases.
Competitors' Standing As Aggrieved Persons
Cases which involve administrative action impairing the prospective
litigant's business in its competition with another present several recurring
factual situations which can be divided into two major categories, the first
dealing with how the injury arose and the second with who is the appellant.
How Did The Injury Arise?
A New Competitor Is Launched
In industries where the government has undertaken to limit entry by
requiring a certificate of public convenience and necessity or similar permit
for newcomers, ° or agency approval for extension or expansion of an
existing business,31 the administrative action results in an increase in com-
petition for established businesses which may, therefore, wish to challenge
the order.
Initially, however, the litigant must show that the administrative act
will be detrimental to him; therefore, in some instances where agency cer-
tification is ordered to alleviate inadequate existing service, the litigant
may not be able to show that he will be materially injured as a result of the
order. In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Co. v. FPC,3 2 for example, appellant
was a natural gas carrier, supplying a distributor in the Michigan-Wisconsin
area. The Federal Power Commission had certified the construction of new
lines by other carriers to meet an undersupply in that territory. One of
these carriers planned to deliver gas to appellant's distributor-customer.
Despite appellant's argument of injury from increased competition, standing
was denied. The court found that appellant already had commitments for
its full capacity and did not plan to enlarge its facilities; hence it would lose
no business as a result of deliveries to presently unserved localities. Nor
See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (case involving consti-
tutionality of state legislation; only one Justice discusses a difficult problem of
standing).
29. E.g., compare Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (consumer had
standing under Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), with L. Singer & Sons v.
Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940) (market competitor had no standing under
§ 1(20) of the Interstate Commerce Act).
30. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 884 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a) (1952);
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)
(1952) ; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 987, 49 U.S.C. § 481 (1952).
31. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 383 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1(18) (1952); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 987, 49 U.S.C.
§481 (1952).
32. 219 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955).
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would it lose its existing outlet, since the distributor was under contractual
obligation to receive a fixed amount of gas.s However, where the existing
business can supply service to all who request it, and its service is inadequate
for other reasons, such as inconvenience, the established enterprise may have
standing to challenge certification. In Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v.
United States,34 an existing ferry company was held to have standing to
appeal the certification of a new line. Here appellant's facilities, although
adequate to meet traffic demands, were inconveniently located for many
users. The new line was designed to provide more direct service for part
of this area. Therefore, appellant was threatened with loss of business to
the new line, and this injury was held sufficient for standing.
The necessity of proving injury seems to be the chief obstacle for
litigants in this type of case. Where material detriment is shown, existing
members of regulated industries, such as radio 35 and natural gas,as have
been allowed to challenge certification of competitors. One court indicated
that air carriers may do the same 3 7 Since the administrative action causes
immediate economic effect to this class of litigants, it is likely that they will
prosecute their suits diligently. Furthermore, such competitors often may
be the only group having sufficient interest in the certification to wish to
challenge it in the courts.
Similar considerations justify the standing of rail 38 and motor car-
riers 39 to challenge the certification either of new members of their respective
industries or the territorial expansion of existing concerns. However,
courts have stressed a different factor in sustaining their standing. The
Transportation Act of 1920 40 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
derive from a congressional belief that uncontrolled competition among
railroads results in weak systems and unnecessary duplication of facilities.41
Since promotion of the public interest in transportation is closely connected
with the vitality of individual carriers, it was thought that a major statu-
tory purpose was served by allowing existing rail carriers to challenge rail
33. Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 854 (1948) (no discussion of standing but here appellant would
have been subjected to competition).
34. 285 U.S. 382 (1932).
35. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
36. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 854 (1948) (by implication); Cia Mexicana de Gas v. FPC, 167
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1948); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. FPC, 113 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir. 1940).
37. Pan American Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1941).
38. See Western Pac. Calif. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47 (1931);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 270 U.S. 266 (1926).
39. See, e.g., Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam, 338 U.S. 802 (1949); Lang Transp. Corp. v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Inland Motor Freight v. United
States, 36 F. Supp. 885 (D. Idaho 1941); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United
States, 34 F. Supp. 576 (D. Utah 1940).
40. 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18)-(20) (1952).
41. See note 38 supra.
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extensions which injured them. 2 For similar reasons, this doctrine sub-
sequently was applied to appeals by motor carriers under the Motor Carrier
Act.4
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act," the Administrator
is not charged with certification of the entry of new enterprises into an
industry or the expansion of existing concerns into new territory. How-
ever, administrative rules issued under the act may have similar impact
upon competitive relations. The Administrator, who is authorized to define
standards of quality or identity for products shipped in interstate com-
merce,45 may redefine the standards of a product so that a previously un-
authorized ingredient may be used. Manufacturers of the previously au-
thorized ingredient face new competition and may wish to contest the
validity of the rule. Although the manufacturers' status as aggrieved com-
petitors has not been determined in this situation,4" a dictdm indicates that
standing might result.
47
If the factors previously suggested as influencing the courts' decisions
are considered, this is a justifiable result. In determining whether anyone
other than this appellant could challenge the agency action, it must be
recognized that the iroups theoretically most likely to contest administrative
action under this statute are consumers and competitors. However, in
practice, consumer action does not effectively police the Administrator since
individual consumers are unlikely to be sufficiently interested to spend time
and money to appeal. Consumer associations also have not been active
litigants under the act in cases involving these rules, possibly because they
have involved little danger to consumer interests. So long as there is no
danger of an unhealthful or substandard product, consumers are unlikely
to appeal rules which arbitrarily favor one group of manufacturers. The
only other possibility for appeal of this form of improper administration is
through the medium of a competitor's complaint.
Suppliers Who Are Excluded From Their Markets
A second recurring factual situation in which action by an adminis-
trative agency affects a competitive relationship develops when the agency
forecloses a supplier of goods and services from selling in a market in
42. Ibid. In Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382
(1932), the act was interpreted to authorize parties in interest to challenge the im-
proper grant of a certificate as well as to enjoin uncertified construction.
43. See 54 STAT. 922 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1952), and cases cited in
note 39 mtpra.
44. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952).
45. 52 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a) (1952).
46. See Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt, 132 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943)
(standing may be based in part on unfairness of competition); Reade v. Ewing,
205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) (manufacturer's standing upheld on allegations of con-
sumer interest). The Reade rule offers competitors an alternate basis of standing
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as consumers; however, the rule
has not been used since its formulation.
47. United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116, 120 (2d
Cir. 1943) (dictum).
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which he had been operating prior to his exclusion. The immediate effect
of such action is, of course, positive harm to the excluded supplier, but his
removal probably redounds to the benefit of manufacturers of competing
substitutes who will fill the void. Unlike the previous situation in which
a new competitor was certified, here the administrative agency is not neces-
sarily concerned with the effect of its action on the competitive relationship.
For example, the exclusion of the supplier might be based entirely upon a
finding that his selling is inconsistent with the public interest.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture 48 is illustrative of the
excluded supplier cases. A manufacturer of corn syrup appealed a regula-
tion of the Secretary which established a definition and standard of identity
for sweetened condensed milk. The rule, which allowed the use of other
sweeteners, did not authorize the use of corn syrup. Therefore, canners
of milk sold in'interstate commerce would no longer buy from appellant.
Similarly, in National Coal Ass'n v. FPC,4 9 an FPC order authorizing
construction of natural gas pipe lines to service the atomic energy plant at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee was appealed by representatives of the coal pro-
ducers who had been supplying fuel to the government project and who
now would lose a substantial volume of business. In both cases standing
was sustained.
Decisions upholding standing in this factual situation seem justifiable.
Although the litigant may have the opportunity to sell his goods elsewhere,
he has been injured by the dislocation following a considerable loss of
existing business. Therefore, he has the requisite adverse interest and will
diligently prosecute his appeal. The desirability of recognizing supplier's
standing is reinforced by the small likelihood that others will be sufficiently
interested to appeal this administrative action. Standing probably will be
upheld consistently on similar facts 50 since the close nexus between the
administrative action and the injury can be recognized even by courts which
purport to decide cases solely by considering the immediacy of appellant's
injury.
Not every enterprise which loses a customer or group of customers
may be allowed to appeal the administrative action that caused the loss.
In the type of case discussed above, the administrative action was directed
toward the supplier's customers. But, exclusion-from-market injury can
ricochet. Thus, where this supplier loses one customer, he in turn may
stop buying from his supplier. This chain reaction effect could be quite
widespread so that the number of persons, each of whom has lost a market,
could become very large although only one administrative rule is involved.5'
48. 120 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1941).
49. 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
50. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ewing, 201 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 923 (1953) (by implication, standing upheld on facts similar to Staley).
Cf. Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Chicago, 115 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940) (standing denied
excluded supplier in the absence of an aggrieved person provision).
51. In National Coal, appellants also included representatives of the railroads car-
rying the coal to Oak Ridge and mine employees.
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Courts often employ the rubric of "indirect" injury to justify a decision
denying standing to most of these potential litigants. More than likely
the interests of persons more remote from the initial impact of the agency
action will be adequately represented by other appellants. In terms of
policies which seem to influence the standing result,52 the real problem
presented by appeals of secondary suppliers and competitors is whether
there will be sufficient gain in terms of effective policing of the agency
to warrant the extension of standing to additional interests.53
Removal of a Competitors Restriction or Grant of a Benefit
A third basic situation in which administrative action disrupts a com-
petitive relationship occurs when the agency removes a restriction which
had theretofore hampered one competing with the appellant or bestows
some benefit on the competitor which enables him to compete more ef-
fectively. The injury on which the litigant asserts standing is the actual
or prospective loss of business resultant from this administrative action.
Such cases rarely have arisen under an "aggrieved person" statute
so the factual situations can be best illustrated by two "legal injury" cases.
The first was Hines v. United States5 4 which involved a decree that
lumber jobbers could store lumber in railroad cars without paying a pen-
alty rate that had been levied prior to the order. This was appealed by
some lumber manufacturers who had their own storage facilities and did
not stand to gain by the change which benefited their competitors, who
lacked such facilities. In the second, Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc., v.
United States,55 certain New Orleans shippers attempted to contest the
eradication of rail rates which had been favorable to them and discrimina-
tory against interior shippers. 6 In both cases standing was denied.
One of the few cases 5 7 under an "aggrieved person" provision involv-
ing the removal of a restriction on the litigant's competitor, United States
Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, s indicates that a primary obstacle
to standing under these facts may be the problem of establishing that injury
actually will result from removal of the restriction on the competitor.
That case centered about a regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act by which fruit canners utilizing dextrose and corn sugar no
longer were required to indicate on the product's label that these ingredients
52. See text at pp. 845-47 mipra.
53. See L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.Rt, 311 U.S. 295 (1940); Clarksburg
Publishing Co. v. FPC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC,
191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
54. 263 U.S. 143 (1923).
55. 281 U.S. 249 (1930).
56. Inasmuch as appellant had not exhausted his administrative remedy with re-
spect to the application of the new rate to him, the Court limited the issue on appeal
to whether appellant had standing to contest the eradication of the discriminatory
features of the old rate.
57. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United
States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943); Land
O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt, 132 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943).
58. 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943).
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had been used. Appellants contended that canners now would increase
their purchases of these lower priced sugars and decrease their use of cane
sugar. Standing was denied. The court based its holding upon the fact
that appellants' injury was speculative inasmuch as they had shown no
public sales resistance to products using corn and dextrose sugars where
their presence was indicated on the label.59
This case illustrates the practical difficulty of proving sufficient injury
to meet the requirement of aggrievement. Nevertheless, cases meeting this
requirement conceivably could arise under "aggrieved person" provisions,60
especially under statutes like the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
which apply such provisions to the review of administrative rules.6 1 The
courts may sustain the competitor's standing by analogizing to cases where
a new competitor is launched. In a sense, the administrative launching of
the new enterprise is similar to the removal of a restriction or prohibition
that had prevented previous operation. However, the critical issue in
these cases is likely to be whether other appellants are better suited to
represent the public interest than this appellant would be.
Where grant of a benefit to a competitor, rather than removal of a
restriction, is involved, there is again the initial problem whether or not
the appellant has been injured. One case seems to have avoided this ques-
tion by sustaining standing to challenge the validity of the grant of a federal
subsidy solely on the basis of a general allegation of a competitive relation-
ship.62 Since judicial interpretation of the "case" or "controversy" provi-
sions requires some showing of adverse effect, it would have been preferable
for the court to have articulated what detriment the appellant suffered.
However, where the grant of a federal subsidy, such as air mail pay, 3 is sub-
ject to an "aggrieved person" appeal, it might be necessary to minimize the
requirement of substantial injury to assure some judicial review. While
the Postmaster General has standing to appeal CAB mail pay determina-
tions, he might do so only infrequently, as where novel questions of law
are presented.65 The recipient's competitor may be the only person likely
59. Id. at 121.
60. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
61. Although this situation might arise where conditions in an agency order,
such as a certificate of public convenience and necessity, were suspended, it seems
more likely to occur where the agency changes rules which previously operated to the
disadvantage of appellant's competitor. However, some "aggrieved person" provisions
only apply to the review of administrative orders, not rules. See, e.g., Natural Gas
Act, 52 STAT. 831 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1952), United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
FPC, 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
62. American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346
(D.D.C. 1953) (no discussion of adverse effect; court merely speaks of competitor
status). Actually, this case merely suggests what a court faced with the problem
under an "aggrieved person" provision might do. The case itself turns on a ques-
tionable construction of section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. See
text following note 101 infra.
63. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 998, 1024, 49 U.S.C. §§ 486(a),
646(a) (1952).
64. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 347 U.S. 67 (1954).
65. Ibid.
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to police the Board regularly, challenge favoritism, or present facts militat-
ing against the recipient's claims. Indeed, the competitor may have fuller
knowledge of such matters than the Post Office Department. However,
appellant's difficulty in establishing that he has been injured by action
benefiting his competitor partially may explain the paucity of cases in
this area.66
Who Is the Appellant?
The determination of the standing issue may depend not only on the
manner in which the injury arose but, under some statutes, may turn upon
the identity of the appellant. For example, where a statute has been passed
to protect a certain class of persons, the identity of an appellant as. a
member of that class is fair assurance of standing to appeal.67 This issue
of identity becomes- especially important in two factual situations: when
the appellant is not a member of the industry regulated by the agency whose
action is in question, and when the appellant is a representative trade asso-
ciation.
Appellants Who Are Not Members of the Industry
A leading case dealing with the problem of the standing of an outsider
to challenge administrative action is L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac.
R.R.68 There standing to enjoin 69 rail extension was denied because
the plaintiff was not a member of the transportation industry. Plaintiffs
were produce merchants and city officials connected with a municipal market
which served a large surrounding territory. The rail extension in issue
was intended to provide transportation facilities for a proposed competitive
market. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs'
suit on the ground that plaintiffs failed to show a "special and peculiar
interest" in the transportation situation and that their interest merely was
in the status of market competition as affected by the rail extension. This
opinion emphasized that the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act is to
promote the public interest in transportation through maintenance of the
vitality of the member units. Injury to market competitors reflects no im-
mediate danger to the transportation system.
70
66. For a discussion of standing problems in subsidy cases, see Eisenberg, supra
note 12.
67. See, e.g., Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953), and cases cited in
note 38 mspra.
68. 311 U.S. 295 (1940).
69. While the case involved standing to enjoin an uncertified rail extension, courts
applying § 1(20) of the ICA have reached similar results in cases of standing to sue
and standing to appeal. Compare cases cited in note 38 mspra, with Claiborne-
Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932).
70. The dissent asserts that an important factor considered by the Commission
is the effect of rail extension on market competition. 311 U.S. at 312. The cases
which it cites indicate that the Commission has not given this factor the weight
which the dissent claims. See, e.g., Western Pac. Calif. R.R., 162 I.C.C. 5 (1930);
Minnesota Western R.R., 111 I.C.C, 377 (1926).
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A concurring opinion of five Justices expressed an unwillingness to
involve the courts in the task of determining the standing of the numerous
private interests who might be affected by rail extension unless there was
an express congressional mandate. 71 The opinion reasoned that since the
act expressly granted the ICC and state agencies, as well as any "party
in interest," standing to sue, the meaning of "party in interest" should be
restrictively interpreted to compel most private concerns to seek redress
through the administrative bodies, who would amply protect their interest.
This consideration of adequate protection by other litigants is also
relevant under other statutes to determine the standing of non-members
of the industry who attempt to contest certification, since existing mem-
bers usually will be able to challenge the agency decision.72 However, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently upheld the stand-
ing of oil barge operators to challenge an order authorizing a gas pipe line
to convert and carry petroleum into the market served by appellants. 73
The court distinguished Singer because the applicable statute in this case
provides no special scheme for official challenge of administrative error.
74
The decision would remain unreviewed unless appellant could appeal since
existing members of the natural gas industry would certainly not contest
the order.
In Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC,7 5 the standing of a newspaper
to appeal the grant of a television station license was upheld without dis-
cussion. If the considerations favoring some restriction of the number
of litigants are sound, this result is questionable since existing radio and
television licensees are potential appellants. 76 However, in some situations,
it might be useful to allow newspapers to appeal a grant of a television
license. The applicant may be controlled by interests which also control
most of the other communications media in the area.77 Or, though com-
71. 311 U.S. at 305. Four Justices concurred both in the opinion of the Court
and in the separate concurring opinion.
72. See text at pp. 846-47 supra.
73. Pittsburgh v. FPC, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2418 (D.C. Cir. March 8, 1956).
74. Pittsburgh v. FPC, supra note 73, at 2419. The provision for judicial review
merely grants standing to an "aggrieved party." Natural Gas Act, 55 STAT. 831
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1952). This class does not seem to include official bodies
since the preceding subsection specifies that certain officials and "aggrieved parties"
may petition the FPC for a rehearing. Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 831 (1938), 15
U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1952).
75. 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See, generally, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1080
(1954) (discussing an FCC decision in this case).
76. Cf. Salinas Broadcasting Corp., 3 PIKE & FISCHER AD. L. DEC. (2d ser.)
369 (FCC 1953) (existing television station) ; Versluis Radio and Television, Inc.,
3 PIKE & FISCHER AD. L. DEC. (2d ser.) 365 (FCC 1953) (radio station). Both
cases involve standing to protest the grant of a license without a hearing. See
note 79 infra. Although standing before an agency may be based on different con-
siderations than standing to appeal, Davis, supra note 16, at 381-86, the criteria sup-
posedly are the same under the Federal Communications Act. See Metropolitan
Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Note,
Standing To Protest Before the FCC, 55 COLU. L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1955).
77. This was alleged to be the situation in Clarksburg. 225 F.2d at 515-16, 518-19.
This factor may be taken into consideration in determining whether grant of the
license application will be in the public interest. Id. at 519.
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petitors exist, they may forebear from challenging the application in re-
turn for a similar future favor.7 8 In either case, a license might be granted
to an undesirable applicant without challenge by members of the indus-
try.79 The advisability of the Clarksburg result, therefore, depends on
whether its usefulness in this special circumstance will be outweighed by
the inconvenience of unmeritorious or unnecessary 80 newspaper appeals.81
A somewhat analogous situation may arise under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act where a supplier of an ingredient may have stand-
ing to appeal a change in the standards of a product's identity or quality.
Practically, suppliers may be the only group likely to raise the question in
the courts; manufacturers of the standardized product are not likely to
appeal if there is little difference in cost between this ingredient and its
substitutes. The small likelihood of consumer appeal has been noted.
Furthermore, even if the theories for limiting the number of litigants are
valid, the class of prospective appellants here involved is small.
Trade Associations
The trade association is the second type of litigant whose standing
may be questioned on the ground it is not the proper plaintiff or appellant.
However, the issue has arisen infrequently and, when it has, courts have
generally determined the issue as if the appellant were the individual
affected enterprise. For example, in National Coal,8 2 the standing of the
78. Cf. id. at 519-20 (allegations that Clarksburg bought off a competitive
applicant).
79. To expedite the establishment of television service and clear up a large number
of pending applications (FCC ANN. REP. 93 (1953)), the FCC has utilized its
statutory powers to grant a license without a hearing. Federal Communications Act,
66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C. §309(a) (1952); 47 C.F.R. § 1.382 (1953). Therefore,
certain private persons, by protest, may call the FCC's attention to facts which show
the issuance of a license not to be in the public interest. See, generally, Note, 55
CoLtum. L. REv. 209 (1955); 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1080 (1954).
80. Cf. FCC ANN. REP. 93 (1954) (protests made unnecessarily and to prevent
competition) ; Note, 55 Cojum. L. Rzv. 209, 223 (1955).
81. Similarly under other statutes, where the outsider is a member of a different
segment of the same industry, such an appellant may have standing-for one of
several reasons. Because of the public interest in the vitality of both modes of trans-
portation, railroads have standing to appeal injurious Commission action which con-
cerns motor carriers, Alton R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942), even though
competing motor carriers also may have standing. See note 39 supra. Moreover,
appeal from the other portion is desirable if the objection to the administrative action
is based on unfair favoritism of one segment at the other's expense. For these reasons,
it seems likely that motor carriers would have standing in the reverse situation.
For different reasons, natural gas pipe line certification is subject to appeal by coal
producers. See text at note 49 supra. Their standing may furnish appeals to test
the validity of certification where, because there is no existing gas carrier in the
area, ibid., or the existing carrier has commitments for his full capacity, see text at
note 32 supra, there is no eligible challenger in the ranks of the natural gas industry.
Furthermore, producers of competing fuels have some interest in this matter since
Congress indicated that the possible effect on such interests should be considered in
the certification proceeding. H.R. REP. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1941);
National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462, 465 (1951).
82. See text at note 49 supra. See also United States Cane Sugar Refiners'
Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943); Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes,
134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) ; cf. Land O'Lakes
Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt, 132 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943).
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coal producers who were represented by their trade association was up-
held. Federal courts have avoided the conceptual objection that the asso-
ciation has no interest in the dispute.sa In practice, many trade associa-
tions are active proponents of their members' interests in desired legisla-
tion. They may act as a liaison between the agency and regulated industry.
Thus they will have an adversary interest in matters adversely affecting
the industry. Furthermore, one possible result of denying standing to
the association might be that the association's counsel merely would conduct
the appeals in the names of particular members.8 4 However, these con-
siderations, which would tend to support allowing the association to
challenge administrative action in behalf of its members, may be overbal-
anced by the possible tendency of the association to act in the interests
of its members in blocking additional competition. The association may
challenge certification of new competitors as a matter of course. Such
perfunctory action may result merely in obstructing or delaying the en-
trance of the new business without any corresponding gain to the public
interest in the correction of administrative error.85
THE EFFECT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRoCEDuRE ACT ON THE PRIOR
LAW OF STANDING
Although enactment of comprehensive legislation covering adminis-
trative procedure could have considerably clarified the law of standing,
two major issues still remain unresolved under the APA.8 6 There is
doubt as to whether the more liberal statutory standing rules have been
extended to encompass all administrative action or cover only action by
those agencies previously subject to "aggrieved person" appeal. Secondly,
there still has been no definitive determination whether the act permits
standing whenever the litigant has in fact incurred some detriment because
of administrative action.
The uncertainty stems from the ambiguous language of section 10(a).
The section provides:
"Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning
of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof." 
8 7
83. For an example of such conceptualism, see Penn-Harris Hotel Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 166 Pa. Super. 394, 71 A.2d 853 (1950).
84. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo.),
aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (appellants actually were represented by counsel
for the Association of Western Railways).
85. See Byse, Opportunity To Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
57, 96-99 (1952), for a review of the standing of trade associations of liquor licencees
to participate in the administrative hearing. The author suggests that neither existing
licencees nor their trade associations should have standing.
86. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
87. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1952).
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Several interpretations are possible. The section may merely codify
existing law with respect to standing. This would require reading the
qualifying clause "within the meaning of any relevant statute" as modify-
ing both "adversely affected" and "aggrieved." It is also possible to con-
strue the language as enlarging the scope of "aggrieved person" appeal
by applying the criteria of adverse effect developed prior to the APA to
all appeals reviewable under the APA. Under this interpretation, the
qualifying phrase would modify only "aggrieved," not "adversely af-
fected." The third possibility is that the APA grants standing to anyone
in fact adversely affected. This requires the same language construction
as the second interpretation, but would remove the "indirect injury" lim-
itation formerly associated with the use of "aggrieved" or "adversely af-
fected," and anyone proving detriment could appeal the administrative ac-
tion which produced it.88
In order to select any of these possibilities as the correct one, one
of the primary issues which must be resolved is whether the phrase
"within the meaning of any relevant statute" qualifies "adversely af-
fected" as well as "aggrieved." If the qualification only were intended to
modify "aggrieved," it would have been preferable to place a comma after
"adversely affected." More important, however, if section 10(a) itself
grants standing to persons adversely affected, certain phrases in the section
are practically surplusage. It seems quite improbable that one could suffer
"legal wrong" 89 but not be adversely affected. Yet section 10(a) begins
by mentioning those who suffer such "legal wrong." Similarly, it would
have been unnecessary to further provide standing for persons "aggrieved
. . . within the meaning of any relevant statute." o Such a construction
is unlikely in the absence of a strong basis in legislative history.
88. A fourth possible interpretation is that the phrase "within the meaning of
any relevant statute" modifies both "adversely affected" and "aggrieved," but that
a "relevant statute" need not be the particular one under which the agency acted.
Thus a competitor challenging action taken under the Maritime Act could justify
his standing on the basis of competitor cases under the Communications Act. (Such
a reading of the section may underly the result in American President Lines, Ltd. v.
Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953), discussed in text at note 102
infra.) However, this interpretation not only is unsupported by legislative history
but also seems a vague and circuitous way to extend statutory standing. Furthermore,
the effect of this interpretation might be to render the "legal wrong" provision
superfluous.
89. Both Committee reports and the debates contain confused explanations of
the meaning of "legal wrong." S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 128, 192 (1945) ;
92 CONG. REc. 2152-53 (1946). However, Senator McCarran's final position seems
to have been that this phrase was not intended to change prior law and, therefore,
merely was a substitute for "legal injury." 92 id. at 2153. For an indication of the
constitutional problem which would be raised by allowing persons with no personal
stake in the outcome to challenge official action simply because it may be illegal,
see note 4 .spra.
90. With respect to the contention that "adverse effect" under APA means
"adverse effect in fact," it should also be noted that it would be extremely poor
draftsmanship to use the former phrase, to which a restrictive meaning had been
attached, to indicate a removal of the "indirect injury" limitation-especially when
Congress could have added the words "in fact." Compare the somewhat different
problem of the meaning of "substantial evidence" within APA § 10(e) (B) (5) dis-
cussed in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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Congressional History
Although congressional history of section 10(a) is not conclusive,
it seems to support the view that the provision was intended to enact ex-
isting law. In any event, there is no strong evidence that Congress meant
to change the prior law of standing.
Earlier bills from which the APA finally derived provided:
"Any person adversely affected by any agency action shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof in accordance with this section." 91
Here a change in prior law clearly was expressed. Moreover, the form
of the provision indicates a realization that, if the APA grants standing
based on adverse effect, it is surplusage to provide for the continuance of
prior statutory or "legal wrong" standing.
After the Senate Committee conferred with private groups, repre-
sentatives of the Attorney General and the agencies, 92 section 10(a) was
completely rewritten to read:
"Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action
shall be entitled to judicial review." 93
This second version clearly rejects the initial attempt to change prior law.
The section was revised in committee once more,94 and the result was the
present text of section 10(a). 9r In view of this development of the section,
the crucial phrase "adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the
meaning of any relevant statute" which appears in the final draft merely
seems designed to complete the codification of existing law which the second
draft began.
However, the following statement relating to the final revision ap-
pears in both committee reports:
91. S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1945) (McCarran Bill); H.R. 1203, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1945) (Sumners Bill); see H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1946). A similar provision for standing appeared in several of the
other bills. H.R. 339, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1945); H.R. 1117, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 9 (1945); H.R. 2602, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1945).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1946). The House Committee
was in contact with the Senate Committee during this period and participated in the
bill's development. Id. at 15. The Senate Committee also drew on the House hear-
ings. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1946).
93. Id. at 36; H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1946).
94. Ibid.
95. This result was introduced as revised S. 7 in the Senate and passed on
March 12, 1946. 92 CONG. REc. 2167 (1946). Revised S. 7 was introduced in the
House as H.R. 4941 (Sumners Bill). However, the House Committee had sug-
gested some further clarifications, which did not affect § 10(a). These changes were
introduced in a companion bill, H.R. 5988 (Walters Bill). H.R. REP. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1946). The House passed H.R. 5988 on May 24, 1946.
92 CoNG. REc. 5668 (1946). The Senate adopted this version on May 7. 92 id.
at 5791.
1956] COMPETITORS' STANDING TO CHALLENGE UNDER APA 859
"This subsection confers a right of review upon any person ad-
versely affected in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the
meaning of any statute." 91
The statement indicates that the final draft of the section rejected the
narrow legal injury standing of the second draft, and forms the primary
support for the theory that Congress intended to change prior standing
law and adopted "adverse effect in fact" as a basis of standing under the
APA itself.
However, the authority of the committee statement is uncertain in
light of other portions of the legislative history. In both committee re-
ports, the statement was introduced with a synopsis of section 10(a) which
reads:
"Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action,
or adversely affected within the meaning of any statute, is entitled
to judicial review." 9T
Since this condensation directly relates the qualifying phrase "within the
meaning of any statute" to the term "adversely affected," and makes no
mention of "in fact," it does not support the indication of the statement that
there was a change in law.
Additional weight can be given to the synopsis because it was directly
quoted by the bill's sponsors during the congressional debates to explain
the operation of the section.9 8 Conversely, no reference was made to the
comment. Furthermore, all other references to section 10(a) during the
debates indicated a view that it merely codified prior law. Both a sponsor
and a committee member quoted, with apparent approval, the Attorney
General's statement, "This reflects existing law." '9 The same committee
member cited a Department of Justice memorandum to the same effect. 1,°
It should also be noted that most of these statements by the bill's sponsors
or committee members were made in prepared statements rather than ex-
temporaneously in the course of debate. Clearly, the sponsors and drafts-
men of the statute did not interpret this section as granting standing based
either on adverse effect without reference to the relevant statute or
adverse effect in fact to the review of all agency action. Thus, since the
main course of legislative history indicates that section 10(a) simply cod-
ified prior law and the interpretation necessary to justify a change of prior
law deprives other portions of the section of any real effect, it seems unjus-
96. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
97. Ibid.
98. 92 CONG. REc. 2158 (1946) (Senator McCarran) ; 92 id. at 5654 (Represen-
tative Walters).
99. 92 id. at 2153 (Senator McCarran) ; 92 id. at 2984-85 (Representative Hobbs).
100. 92 id. at 2988 (Representative Hobbs).
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tified to base an important change of law chiefly on a single committee
statement made in ambiguous context.1 "
Judicial Interpretation
Such judicial authority as now exists supports the view that section
10(a) did not change prior law. However, strong authority for either
position is lacking since only one of the cases provides any discussion of
the problem.
The district court for the District of Columbia was the first to interpret
section 10(a), in American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime
Bd.0 2 Plaintiff sought to set aside the grant of a subsidy to a competitor.
No legal injury was involved, and the relevant statute contained no "ag-
grieved person" provision. Nevertheless, standing was upheld. The
court apparently disregarded the qualification "within . . . any relevant
statute," and held plaintiff to be aggrieved, citing as authority cases arising
under the "aggrieved person" provision of the Federal Communications
Act. This interpretation is most consistent with the second possible con-
struction previously discussed. The same court through a different judge
attempted to tie this view more firmly to statutory language in Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Summerfield.10 The court construed the phrase
"within . . . any relevant statute" to modify "such [agency] action."
No explanation of this view was given. The holding is unjustified by any
legislative history; furthermore, under this interpretation the APA does
not expressly provide review of administrative action taken without pre-
tense of authority or under color of an irrelevant statute. Shortly there-
after, the District's Court of Appeals, in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
McKay,1 4 held that section 10(a) did not alter prior law. Relying
101. It may be that this otherwise inexplicable comment was not intended to
convey the meaning it appears to suggest. "Within the meaning of any relevant stat-
ute" can be read to qualify both "adversely affected in fact by agency action" and "ag-
grieved." This reading would bring the comment more nearly into line with the
synopsis which introduces it. Furthermore, the balance of the Senate comment
seeks to explain "legal wrong" as follows:
". .. [T]he phrase 'legal wrong' means such a wrong as is specified in
subsection (e) of this section. It means that something more than mere adverse
personal effect must be shown-that is, that the adverse effect must be an illegal
effect. The law so made relevant is not just constitutional law but any and all
applicable law." S. RF,. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945). (Emphasis
added.)
Therefore, as a whole, the comment not only discusses two different theories of
standing, but also attempts to distinguish them by comparison with a single standard,
"adverse effect." "Legal wrong" standing requires a detriment which is "illegal";
statutory standing merely requires detriment. See also H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 42 (1946); 92 CONG. REc. 2152-53 (1946) (Senate debate). Read in
context, therefore, the phrase "in fact" seems less emphatic, and it seems more likely
that it was used in the first sentence only to anticipate the confused distinction which
follows.
102. 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953) (Holtzoff, J.); see note 88 supra.
103. 128 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1955) (Kirkland, J.).
104. 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
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chiefly on the Attorney General's comment,105 the court expressly rejected
the American President Line interpretation.'" 6 The same result was
reached without discussion in another district.
0 7
Since legislative history, the most reasonable construction of the lan-
guage of section 10(a) and the few decided cases support the conclusion
that the APA merely codifies prior law, it is most likely that future cases
applying the section will hold that standing to appeal administrative deci-
sions will be determined either under the judicial "legal injury" standard
or, where relevant, under a statutory "aggrieved person" provision in-
cluding the embelishments added by case law under the "indirect injury"
limitation.
COMMENTARY
Presently, the most basic issue with respect to statutory standing is
the validity of the fundamental policy assumptions which lead the courts
to interpret the "aggrieved person" provisions restrictively. While com-
petitor cases represent only one segment of the law of standing, they indi-
cate some of the considerations to be taken into account.
Although statutes normally provide that suit or appeal alone will not
operate to stay the effect of an administrative decision, 08 actually judicial
review may prevent a decision from being put into practical effect until its
validity is finally upheld in the courts. For example, entry or expansion
into one of the regulated industries which requires a large monetary outlay
is not likely to be undertaken if the agency certification is being chal-
lenged.'I 9 .However, the significance of this factor will vary with the
type of agency regulation and the expense involved in effectuating the
agency decision. A decision of the Food and Drug Administrator that
a particular ingredient should not be used in the manufacture of a product
can be put into effect immediately, subject to revocation if the reviewing
court reverses the Administrator.
Where judicial review will delay the effect of the administrative deci-
sion, there is a danger that competitors may resort to review merely to
take advantage of this result. Although the expense involved in challenging
such orders will check unfounded resort to the courts to some extent, it
is conceivable in some cases that the litigant will believe a temporary relief
from competition overbalances the costs of suit.110
105. Id. at 932; see text at note 99 supra.
106. 225 F.2d at 932.
107. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo.),
aff'd on other grounds per curiaon, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (alternative holding).
108. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 81, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (a) (1952);
Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 861 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 8251(c) (1952).
109. See note 22 supra.
110. Cf. FCC Arxrx. REP. 93 (1954).
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Another objection occasionally interposed to a liberal application of
standing provisions is that it would result in a flood of appeals to the
courts which would hamper effective administration."' However, the logic
of this position is highly questionable. 12 First, the expense of litigation
will always operate as some deterrent, especially when the prospective liti-
gant's position is being represented by another recognized challenger.
Second, existing statutes specify short periods of time within which
appeals must be taken. 113 Thus, separate suits before the same court
could be consolidated. Other procedural devices further minimize the
possibility that a great number of separate cases simultaneously will be
testing the validity of the same administrative act."4 However, even if
there were some validity in the belief that the number of suits challenging
administration would increase, it does not follow that the result would be
increased ineffectiveness on the administrative level, since the preparation
required to meet court challenge is usually handled by the legal staff rather
than the administrative officials themselves.
The imposition of more liberal statutory standing would always be
subject to some limitation since the courts have interpreted the constitu-
tional "case" or "controversy" provision to require a showing of adverse
effect." 3  Beyond this point, however, arguments against extending stat-
utory standing must depend either on the belief that only litigants who
meet stricter standards of adversity are likely to undertake the most
effective and full presentation of the issues and thereby provide the best
protection of the public interest in rectifying administrative error, or on
the conviction that the delay in the effectiveness of the decision that will
result will greatly impede the public need for expeditious and final admin-
istrative disposal of public business. The competitor cases suggest that
in many instances statutory standing could be granted without disturbing
the functioning of the administrative process. Expansion of the standing
rules is possible even if the APA is determined to have codified prior law,
as suggested. Much of the prior case law involves the courts' interpreta-
111. See United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116,
120 (2d Cir. 1943).
112. See Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed
as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
113. E.g., Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 831 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717r(a)' (1952)
(30 days) ; Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U.S.C.
§371(f)(1) (1952) (90 days).
114. Consolidation of separate appeals further is facilitated under those statutes
which provide that agency action is reviewable only in the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia. E.g., Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C.
§8251(b) (1952); Federal Communications Act, 66 STAT. 718 (1952), 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b) (1952). Other statutes may provide that the circuit court in which a peti-
tion for appeal and a transcript of the record are first filed shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to review the particular order. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT.
80, 15 U.S.C. §77i(a) (1952); Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 832 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 717r(b) (1952). Even where such provisions are not applicable, it is possible for
courts in which later suits or appeals are filed to stay the case pending a decision
by the court in which the first suit or appeal was begun.
115. See note 20 supra.
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tions of the statutory provisions. Judicial re-examination of the assump-
tions behind restrictive application of standing could result in a realization
that the balance of the public need against the public inconvenience
warrants .a more liberal standing policy in many cases.116
116. For the view that standing based on "adverse effect in fact" should be
applicable to the review of all federal administrative action, see Davis, supra note 16,
at 367. The Administrative Code proposed by the Task Force of the Hoover Com-
mission granted a right of review to all persons adversely affected or aggrieved.
U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTI-E BRANCH OF THE GovEN-
mENT, Task Force Report in LEGAL SRVICES AND PROCEDURE 373, 414 (1955).
However, this recommendation was not adopted in the final report. U.S. CoMMIssIoN
ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, Final Report
in LE.A SERVcs AND PRocEDu 75-76 (1955).
